

**CTSAMVM CONFIDENTIAL**

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Headquarters Ceasefire & Transitional Security Arrangements  
Monitoring and Verification Mechanism  
Juba, South Sudan  
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**TO:** Lt. Gen. Rabi Mujung Emmanuel (ITGoNU)  
Maj. Gen. Dr. Chuol Ruey Kompuok (SPLM/A-IO)  
Maj. Gen. Jany Kaway Yoakhor (SSOA)  
Maj. Gen. Bior Leek Kuareng (Former Detainees)

**FROM:** The Chairperson, CTSAMVM

**DATE:** July 2024

**SUBJECT: CTSAMVM REPORT 2024/10 –ALLEGED SECRET TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT BY THE SSPDF**

Please, find attached a report on alleged secret training and recruitment by the SSPDF.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Respectfully,

Major General Yitayal Gelaw Bitew  
Chairperson



**Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism**

# **CTSAMVM REPORT 2024/10 –ALLEGED SECRET TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT BY THE SSPDF**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

On 11 March 2024, CTSAMVM received a letter dated 6 February 2024 from the Deputy Chairman of the SPLM/A-IO containing a series of allegations of military training by Government security forces in Central Equatoria State.

The letter alleged secret training and recruitment by SSPDF along Juba-Torit road at Jebel Mulwa, Mobil Military Barracks along Juba-Terekeka road, buildup of forces at Jebel Lado northwest of Juba Town and along Juba-Bor road. It further stated that an estimated 500 personnel were deployed within the police at Buluk and some in Giada Military Barracks. The letter also claimed presence of Ugandan Forces, the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces' (UPDF) in Luri Barracks.

CTSAMVM visited Luri Training Center, Jebel Lado and Mangala area to verify the allegations of secret training and build up of forces. The investigation did not reveal conduct of secret training but training of VIP force for the President which ended and soldiers were deployed. However, there were other locations, the MVT was not able to access due to lack of clearance. It was also confirmed there was build up of forces particularly in the areas of Molobur base, Nyuwa Boma, Kwerjik and at Loro Bobori Bori Village. In addition, CTSAMVM also wrote to the Ugandan Embassy, to confirm if the Ugandan forces had deployed in South Sudan. The embassy responded to the letter and confirmed there were no presence of UPDF in South Sudan.

CTSAMVM assesses that; The training contravenes the R-ARCSS which prohibits any kind of training of forces except that of Necessary Unified Force; CTSAMVM was not cleared by SSPDF to verify alleged secret training activity in the other areas, this also constitutes denial of access contrary to provisions of the R-ARCSS; The build up of forces at Lado Payam, Nyuwa Boma in Kwerjik, Molobur Boma and Loro Lobori hills including the Forces responsible for movement regulation, the Commando Unit, disarmament forces and the forces deployed to contain issues related to land grabbing contravenes the ACOH on advance notification to CTSAMVM prior to movement of personnel and equipment; The disposition of forces was not declared to CTSAMVM contravening the R-ARCSS; the deployed forces were violating rights



of civilians contrary to the provision of the R-ARCSS on protection of human rights of civilians; lastly, the mobilization and movement of personnel from WBeGS to Loro Loberi in Jebel Lado is an indicator of recruitment which is in violation of the R-ARCSS.

It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM that there was violation by SSPDF in respect to recruitment, training, movement, disposition and cantonment of forces as well as denial of access and protection of human rights of civilians.

CTSAMVM recommends that: ITGoNU to take full responsibility and prevails over SSPDF to take immediate remedial action against the personnel involved and hold them accountable; the Denial of access by signatory parties has continued to hinder the effective fulfillment of CTSAMVM's mandate of monitoring and verification; ITGoNU to implement key provisions of the R-ARCSS; Forces stationed in the outposts were not declared to CTSAMVM and to always be informed of movement of forces as per the provisions of the ACOH; all signatory parties to R-ARCSS are reminded of their obligation to fully implement the peace agreement and IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan, RJMEC and the IGAD Council of Ministers to take all appropriate and timely action at the political level as a result of the violation reports, and to ensure those responsible are held to account.



## CTSAMVM REPORT 2024/10 – ALLEGED SECRET TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT BY THE SSPDF

### References:

A: A letter from the Deputy Chairman SPLM/A-IO and First Deputy speaker-TNLA wrote to CTSAMVM on 6 February 2024.

### INTRODUCTION

1. Background:

- a. On 11 March 2024, CTSAMVM received a letter dated 6 February 2024 from the deputy chairperson of SPLM/A-IO, giving details of force dispositions of the SSPDF and other organized forces in and around Juba City purportedly violating the R-ARCSS and COHA.
- b. The parties were to declare the disposition of their forces and keep them cantoned while observing the ceasefire according to Articles 2.1.11.1 and 2.2.3.3 of the R-ARCSS respectively.
- c. The letter stated that, SSPDF was having undisclosed deployments and conducting training citing;
  - (1) Secret Military training and recruitment by the SSPDF Commando Division National Security Service along the Juba-Torit road at Jebel Mulwa where most recruits were brought from Warrap, NBeGS and Lakes State.
  - (2) Ongoing training at Mobil Military Barracks along the Juba-Terekeka road forces were brought from Warrap, NBeGS and Lakes State.
  - (3) An active ongoing military training and buildup of forces at Jebel Lado northwest of Juba Town.
  - (4) An ongoing active military training along Juba-Bor road, one hour from Mangala centre. An estimated 500 personnel were deployed within the police at Buluk and some in Giada Military Barracks.
  - (5) Presence of Ugandan Forces, the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) in Luri Barracks under coordination of the Military Intelligence Unit.





2. Allegation: The SPLM/A-IO alleged that military training by Government security forces is being conducted in Central Equatoria State coupled with irregular deployments, build up of forces and presence of Ugandan Army in Luri Barracks.

3. Aim: This report aims to present findings of the alleged secret training, recruitment by the SSPDF and presence of foreign forces in South Sudan to attribute responsibility for violations of the R-ARCSS where appropriate and make recommendations to foster compliance with the R-ARCSS.

4. Investigation: Investigations were undertaken with National Monitors from all parties.

5. Methodology:

a. On 05 April 2024, CTSAMVM Juba MVT visited Luri Training Center and Jebel Lado in Lado Payam and conducted face-to-face interviews and investigations with Juba county leadership, security organs, local witnesses and various key leaders.

b. CTSAMVM interviewed a range of witnesses including:

- (1) Hon. Emmanuel Teta Simon Juba County Commissioner.
- (2) Brig/Gen Mario Awet Alor Kuol, Luri Training Centre.
- (3) Mr. Gasim Erasto Ibrahim Lado Lado Payam Director.
- (4) Beda Elia Tonging, Head Chief Lado Payam West Boma
- (5) Charles Laku Wani Executive Chief Jebel Lado East Boma.
- (6) Capt William Comdr Mobil Checkpoint Terekeka.
- (7) Capt Paulino Deng Ater Commando unit Mangala Payam.

c. Standard of proof: The standard of proof used by CTSAMVM to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to verify that a party is not in compliance with the provisions of the agreements is “reasonable grounds to believe that the incident subject to the investigation occurred”. This is in accordance with accepted practice for monitoring mechanisms and human rights and humanitarian entities and signifies that sufficient facts and evidence have been collected to conclude that an event happened.



6. **Findings:** Include the following;

- a. There was no evidence of training for new recruits in Luri training centre in accordance with the R-ARCSS except training for the VIP Protection Force of the President. However, CTSAMVM was not cleared by SSPDF to access other camps to verify any alleged secret training activity in the general area.
- b. There was no evidence of recruitment and training in Mobil Barracks since there is no Mobil barracks along Juba-Terekeka road. There is Mobil check point after the Lado Payam HQs, composed of Joint Operation Forces responsible for movement regulation along Juba-Terekeka road. Forces deployed in the area include Commando Unit in Nyuwa Boma, disarmament forces in Kwerjik and forces deployed to contain issues related to land grabbing in Molobur Boma. The VIP protection force had been deployed to Abyei and only one battalion of VIP Force was on standby and is administered by Bilpham.
- c. In Mangala Payam, there was also no evidence of recruitment and training along the stretch of Juba-Bor road and Mangala. Further, CTSAMVM MVT Juba did not find evidence of any training activities in the areas of Gut Makur/Dr. John Garang Memorial Military College which are close to Mangala Payam.
- d. The Juba County Commissioner confirmed that Government deployed Joint Operation Forces on 03 April 2024, to reinforce ground security to protect civilians in Lado Payam to help contain land-grabbing activities. The community welcomed the joint forces and offered land to be allocated to the Joint Operation Forces under the supervision of Bilpham for one month. Plans were still underway to establish a police station in the area to handle civilian matters.
- e. The forces set up camp at Loro Lobori hills overseeing the Jebel Lado West Boma in Lado Payam, they are equipped with mounted vehicles and also had Bulldozers hired from businessmen in Juba. There were complaints from the community that, the forces conducted a chain of atrocities against locals including killing one youth, arbitrary arrest of civilians in Molobur Boma and destruction of property and looting.
- f. There was no evidence of the alleged 500 personnel being deployed within the police at Buluk and Giada military barracks. However, the Director Lado Payam confirmed that Four (4) buses brought people (alleged to be IDPs) from Western





el Ghazal(WBeGS) on 03 March 2024. Other people allegedly came from the Mangateen Area, Gumbo, and Jebel Dinka around Juba City to be part of the IDPs. They pitched camp at Loro Lobori Bori village, Jebel Lado West Boma. They shifted from the demarcated land in the Jebel Lado area to Molobur Boma on 09 March 2024, dressed in military uniforms and attacked the villagers. When forces deployed to contain issues related to land grabbing arrived on 3 April 2024, conflict ensued amongst them and the alleged IDPs, which resulted in shooting of a young boy.

g. CTSAMVM wrote to the Embassy of Uganda in Juba to confirm the presence of Uganda Peoples Defence Forces' (UPDF) in Luri Training Centre, the Ugandan Embassy affirmed by a letter citing, *"the information circulating that UPDF has deployed again in South Sudan is false. It is intended to cause anxiety and uncertainty in the country"*.

7. Assessment: CTSAMVM assesses as follows:

a. That there was no evidence of alleged secret training in Luri training center and other areas visited by CTSAMVM mentioned in the letter except the VIP Protection Force to the president. The training contravenes Article 2.1.8 of the R-ARCSS which prohibits any kind of training of forces except of Necessary Unified Force.

b. CTSAMVM was not cleared by SSPDF to access other camps along Juba-Torit road at Jebel Mulwa to verify any alleged secret training activity in the general area which constitute denial of access contrary to article 2.1.10.6 of the R-ARCSS.

c. The build up of forces at Lado Payam, Nyuwa Boma in Kwerjik, Molobur Boma and Loro Lobori hills which includes the Forces responsible for movement regulation, the Commando Unit, disarmament forces and the forces deployed to contain issues related to land grabbing contravenes Article 11(6) of ACOH on advance notification to CTSAMVM prior to movement of personnel and equipment.

d. The disposition of the forces and cantonment of the forces listed in 7c above was not declared to CTSAMVM contravening articles 2.1.11.1 and 2.2.3.3 of the R-ARCSS respectively.



- e. The mobilization and movement of people from WBeGS to Loro Lobori in Jebel Lado is an indicator of recruitment which is in violation of Article 2.1.8 of the R-ARCSS.
- f. The forces brought to protect the local population by reinforcing ground security in Lado Payam are perpetuating more harassment against civilians in contravention to Article 2.1.10.7.4 of the R-ARCSS on protection of human rights of civilians.
8. Conclusion: It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM that there was violation by SSPDF in respect to training, recruitment, movement, disposition and cantonment of forces, denial of access and protection of human rights of civilians.
9. Observations and recommendations, CTSAMVM recommends that:
- a. ITGoNU to take full responsibility for the training, recruitment, movement, disposition and cantonment of forces, denial of access and protection of human rights of civilians and take immediate remedial action against the personnel involved and hold them accountable.
- b. Denial of access by signatory parties has continued to hinder the effective fulfillment of CTSAMVM mandate of monitoring and verification.
- c. The incidents described in this report demonstrate failure by the ITGoNU to implement key provisions of the R-ARCSS. Forces stationed in the outposts were not declared to CTSAMVM.
- d. CTSAMVM should always be informed of movement of forces prior as per the provisions of Article 11.6 of the ACOH.
- e. All signatory parties to R-ARCSS are reminded of their obligation to fully implement the peace agreement.
- f. The IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan, RJMEC and the IGAD Council of Ministers to take all appropriate and timely action at the political level as a result of the violation reports, and to ensure those responsible are held to account.

